Introduction
A few years ago, some deans of business schools announced new criteria for tenure and promotion that place extreme emphasis on publications in so-called A journals. The deans' statements implied that articles in A journals are essential and those in B or C journals are insignificant. To gain tenure or promotion to full professor, they said, a professor must have published at least N publications in A journals.
Even though many social science departments and business schools use such an approach to faculty evaluation, its apparent oversimplification and narrow focus is disturbing. Journals with higher prestige usually publish more high-value articles, but lower-prestige journals also publish excellent articles and high-prestige journals publish pedestrian articles. One can see substantial value overlap among journals with very different prestige. The most influential writings have included books and chapters in books, and distinguished social scientists have told me they refuse to submit their manuscripts to journals. When Gans and Shepherd (1994) asked 140 leading economists what they thought about review processes, 60% of them took time to reply, some wrote "several blistering pages" (p. 165), and many told stories about very influential articles that journals had rejected.
This situation has contradictory aspects for me. Personal experience tells me that it makes no sense to judge articles solely on the journals in which they appear. I have served on editorial boards of 15 journals in four fields, including journals with great prestige and journals with none; I have reviewed manuscripts for many other journals; and I have read debates about peer review. However, emphasis on A journals is widespread, and widespread practices almost always benefit someone. To move beyond philosophy and ad hoc opinion, I decided to review evidence about peer review and to analyze statistically the articles in different prestige strata.
One needs to analyze these issues in terms of fundamental statistics rather than only in terms of data because reputations and citations are strongly influenced by social construction. Journals' citation rates and reputations reflect other factors as well as the average value of articles. Citation rates of journals correlate with such factors as fields' citation practices, journals' circulations, journals' languages, and the nations where journals are published. Journals' reputations have been rather inertial despite shifting editorial policies. The statistics help to distinguish the processes themselves from their social context. This article draws on data about review processes to frame a statistical analysis of differences between the top 20%, the middle 40%, and the bottom 40% of journals. Although the theory generalizes to other fields, this article focuses on economics, psychology, sociology, and their business-school cousin, management. The next section reviews trends in citations to journals in these four fields. This review suggests that increasing emphasis on top-tier journals results from administrative choice rather than from adaptation to widespread trends in social sciences. Final sections of this article discuss how emphasis on top-tier publications affects personnel evaluations, the standings of departments and schools, and the development of knowledge. Because examination of these issues needs a theoretical framework, the middle sections of this article develop a statistical theory that describes how editorial acceptances and rejections vary with reviewers' abilities to assess manuscripts.
Some ideas in this article, especially those in the middle section, will be familiar to readers of the many articles about peer review. What this article contributes is a more integrated and systematic analysis rooted in a statistical theory. This theory helps to relate properties of review processes to citation practices, and it allows inferences about the usefulness for personnel evaluations of counts of publications in prestigious journals.
For Whom Have Very Prestigious Journals Become More Important?
One of my initial conjectures was that the deans' policy change might be part of a widespread trend. I read an article in which Ellison (2002, p. 978) remarked that articles in five top-tier economics journals had been attracting more and more citations, whereas articles in second-and third-tier economics journals had been attracting fewer and fewer citations. Ellison's observation raised the possibility that the new policies at some business schools might reflect trends in social sciences generally. The solid lines in Figure 1 graph impact factors of 21 economics journals Ellison studied. It uses his classifications of these journals as top tier, second tier, or third tier, but uses my own data about impact factors from 1981-2002. Impact factors are published by the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI), which surveys citations in thousands of academic journals (Amin and Mabe 2000) . An impact factor is the average number of citations received 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 Citations in year t to articles published in t − 1 or t − 2 Articles published in years t − 1 or t − 2 ISI has said that two years are long enough to obtain high percentages of citations for nearly all articles, so impact factors accurately reflect visibility of journals even though they may not accurately reflect visibility of specific articles. Because this article aggregates impact data across many journals, it places no reliance on the representativeness of impact factors for single articles or even single journals. Ellison's observation suggested two possibilities. First, trends in economics might be widespread across social sciences. Second, deans who are economists might have adopted a policy that reflected conditions peculiar to their own discipline.
To find out whether many business schools were increasing their emphasis on top-tier publications, I queried colleagues at 16 top North American business schools. Three respondents pointed out that because rankings by Business Week and Financial Times now take account of publications in journals that these magazines deem influential, such publications have become more salient. Colleagues at six schools replied that their schools have been placing strong emphasis on publications in prestigious journals for many years; these 6 schools received an average rank of 6.6 from Business Week in 2002, much higher than the average rank of 11.8 for the other 10 schools. Another six colleagues stated that their schools use broader criteria than publications in prestigious journals, and that they deem their own faculties to be more capable of evaluating research than journal reviewers are; Business Week assigned these six schools heterogeneous ranks in 2002. Colleagues at only four schools said they had noticed an increased emphasis on publishing in prestigious journals during recent years; these 4 schools received an average rank of 15.8 from Business Week in 2002, much lower than the average rank of 7.6 for the other 12 schools.
To find out whether economics is distinctive among social sciences, I examined data about impact factors of journals related to business. These data include only journals that received at least six citations during 2001 from some combination of 150 business journals, and I have not retained data about journals that have ceased publication. Both biases imply an underrepresentation of journals having very low citation rates. I have data about 102 economics journals, 95 management journals (including industrial relations), 90 psychology journals, and 47 sociology journals.
My first discovery was that Ellison's finding is specific to economics, and especially to the 21 journals he examined and how he classified them. If one classifies journals into strata based on their citation rates during recent years, then top-strata journals do appear to have gained over lower-strata journals. Gains appear to have occurred in all fields. However, these gains are illusions created by retrospective sense making: Those that did better appear to have done better in retrospect. When I reclassified journals each year based on citation rates in that year, different trends appeared. The dashed lines in Figure 1 show the impact factors for 102 economics journals when these are divided into three broad categories-the most-cited quintile, the second and third quintiles, and the two least-cited quintiles. The average impact factor of the most-cited quintile of economics journals actually decreased about 10% over the two decades, and the increase Ellison observed was specific to the five journals on which he focused.
Figure 2 graphs two ratios for each of four fields:
Three-year average impact factor for the most-cited quintile of journals Three-year average impact factor for the two least-cited quintiles of journals and Three-year average impact factor for the second and third quintiles of journals Three-year average impact factor for the two least-cited quintiles of journals.
For example, the heavy solid line in Figure 2 is the ratio of citations to the most-cited quintile versus citations to the two least-cited quintiles for management journals, and the light solid line is the ratio of citations to the second and third quintiles versus citations to the two least-cited quintiles for management journals. I divide journals into three large categories partly because rankings of specific journals are unstable over time and partly 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 Year Ratio of average impact factors Top management, Mean = 6.2 Top economics, Mean = 5.6 Top psychology, Mean = 8.6 Top sociology, Mean = 4.2 Second-third management, Mean = 2.7 Second-third economics, Mean = 2.1 Second-third psychology, Mean = 3.0 Second-third sociology, Mean = 2.1 because I want to discuss the overall stratification of academic journals and do not want to focus on a small number of highly prestigious journals. Figure 2 shows that, in economics, there has been an increase in citation rates of higher-status journals relative to lower-status journals. The ratio of citations to the most cited versus the least cited rose 27%, and the ratio of citations to the second and third quintiles versus the least-cited rose 33% over the two decades. However, these changes are entirely due to decreasing citations of the least-cited journals. As Figure 2 shows, citation rates decreased in all three categories over the two decades, but the percentage decrease was larger for the least-cited journals.
The most striking trends in Figure 2 are decreases in the ratios for management and psychology journals, especially during the early 1980s. The ratio of top-tobottom declined 12% in sociology, 35% in management, and 40% in psychology. These decreases are largely due to increases in citations of the least-cited journals. The average impact factor of the least-cited journals increased 4% in sociology, 36% in psychology, and 81% in management. Thus, stratification decreased in all three fields, but it decreased less in sociology, which was initially more egalitarian. Figure 2 does not support the notion that social science researchers have been citing top-tier journals more often and bottom-tier journals less often. On the contrary, with the exception of economics, citation data mainly indicate that researchers have been citing bottomtier journals more often. These data do suggest, however, that economists might have perceived an increased emphasis on their top-tier journals, whereas psychologists, sociologists, and management researchers might have perceived a decreased emphasis on their top-tier journals.
Thus, an increasing emphasis on publishing in toptier journals seems to be a consequence of administrative choice rather than adaptation to trends in social sciences in general. Some business schools that are very highly rated by business magazines have been emphasizing top-tier publications for a long time. Because those business schools that have only recently begun to place more emphasis on publishing in top-tier journals are not among the most highly rated schools, they may be pursuing greater legitimacy by imitating their moreprestigious competitors (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) . One issue this situation poses is whether an emphasis on top-tier publications may produce the changes in faculty that departments and schools seek. A second issue is whether overemphasis on top-tier publications may degrade research and slow development of knowledge. I can address these issues more intelligently after developing a theory about the review process and then reexamining data about impact factors. Although a theory has the disadvantage of requiring explicit assumptions about the review process, it clarifies issues regarding the dependability of editorial processes. Rousseeuw (1991, p. 41) commented, "It is commonly known and a constant course of frustration that even well-known refereed journals contain a large fraction of bad articles which are boring, repetitive, incorrect, redundant, and harmful to science in general. What is perhaps even worse, the same journals also stubbornly reject some brilliant and insightful articles (i.e., your own) for no good reason." Rousseeuw explained that because editorial decision makers are imperfect, errors occur; because "bad papers are submitted in such vast quantities the small fraction of them that gets accepted may outnumber the good ones" (1991, p. 43) .
A Statistical Theory
Unfortunately, most academics may not appreciate the degree to which "even well-known refereed journals contain a large fraction of bad articles" and "reject some brilliant and insightful articles." As Rousseeuw implied, we find it easier to believe that errors occurred when journals rejected our own manuscripts than when the same journals rejected other people's manuscripts (an example of the "self-serving" bias; Heider 1958) . Lindsey (1978) and Stinchcombe and Ofshe (1969) presented arguments similar to Rousseeuw's, and they and Rousseeuw supported their observations with statistical calculations that made hypothetical assumptions. The analysis below improves on their analyses by allowing for more complex review processes, by anchoring key assumptions in data about real reviewers' behavior, and by showing how inferences do or do not change with different assumptions. Although the analysis is algebraic at root, this article states no formulas because its formulas appear in every textbook on mathematical statistics. Instead of formulas, this article presents graphs showing the sensitivity of inferences to different assumptions. Some of these graphs are surprising in that they indicate review processes would act similarly for a wide range of assumptions about these processes or about reviewers' abilities.
What Is the Value of a Manuscript?
This article talks about three kinds of values. One of these, discussed near the end of this article, is citation value-the value that researchers see when they choose published works to cite. Citation value is partly a self-fulfilling prophecy because articles in higher-status journals attract more attention and more citations (Gottfredson 1978 , Lindsey 1978 , PalaciosHuerta and Volij 2004 . This creates circular causality: Articles receive more citations because they appear in higher-prestige journals, and journals gain prestige because they publish articles that receive more citations. However, noncircular factors are also at work. Citations correlate strongly with each journal's circulations, publication by a professional association, and nationality and language. Fields have different norms about citation practices. Citations of individual articles correlate with articles' lengths, numbers of references they cite, numbers of coauthors, and nonuse of mathematics. Theoretical discussions attract more citations than do empirical studies, and general-interest articles attract more citations than articles on specialized topics (Stigler 1994) . Undoubtedly, a published article ends up with a retrospective value that reflects what journal published it, who cited it, and so forth.
A second value is the manuscript's shared value-its value in the personal value systems of reviewers. Shared value may differ from citation value because reviewers differ from those who cite published articles. Bowen et al. (1972) suggested that shared value might sometimes increase agreement between reviewers for undesirable reasons, as when reviewers favor manuscripts written by members of their journal's editorial board.
The third value is the manuscript's inherent true value-its ability to serve as a basis for widespread social consensus (Calhoun and Starbuck 2003) . True value is the hypothetical quality on which nearly all reviewers ought to be able to agree. Because the main purpose of social science is to produce beliefs with which nearly everyone can agree, even two reviewers who disagree strongly with each other about many issues should be trying to agree with each other about manuscripts' true values. Indeed, one advantage of editors choosing reviewers who might disagree would be that intersections of their judgments would approach true values (Bailar 1991 , Cicchetti 2003 , Hargens and Herting 1990 , Kiesler 1991 . However, editors and referees may agree about properties that constitute true value but be unable to perceive true value accurately. Gottfredson (1978) , Gottfredson and Gottfredson (1982) , and Wolff (1970) found that reviewers for psychological journals agree rather strongly about properties that manuscripts ought to possess, but their judgments about whether specific manuscripts possess various properties agree much less strongly; correlations ranged from 0.16 to 0.50.
Assumptions About Perceptions. Because perception involves error, analysis of how reviewers perceive manuscripts needs to begin from assumptions about errors in perceptions. Psychological research suggests that human perceptions of differences between stimuli depend mainly on percentage differences between stimuli rather than on absolute differences, and Luce and Galanter (1963) showed that a logarithmic transformation of stimuli approximates the idea that people react similarly to equal percentage differences. That is, as a rough approximation, reviewers perceive the logarithms of manuscripts' properties. Psychological research also suggests that perceptions are less discriminating for extreme stimuli, partly because perceivers have less experience with extreme stimuli. Thus, reviewers probably make less sensitive distinctions among extremely good manuscripts or extremely poor ones than among manuscripts they see frequently. However, the analysis below does not rely strongly on the accuracy of extreme perceptions because it only divides manuscripts into three large categories-the most-cited quintile, the second and third quintiles, and the fourth and fifth quintiles. The analysis uses gross categories so that inferences will not depend on the precise accuracy of assumptions, which are approximate.
It also seems reasonable to suppose that manuscripts' true values have skewed distributions that generally resemble lognormals-many mediocre manuscripts and then fewer and fewer manuscripts as value increases. Many phenomena associated with publishing have skewed distributions that resemble lognormals, including impact factors, lengths of books and articles, circulations of journals, and numbers of authors who produce various numbers of articles (West and Shlesinger 1990) . One rationale for such distributions is that intellectual contributions result from multiple elements. Few manuscripts incorporate almost no elements that constitute intellectual contributions, whereas most manuscripts incorporate several of these elements, but fewer and fewer manuscripts incorporate additional elements as the numbers of elements increase. I conjecture that the lognormal pattern of intellectual contributions may derive from humans' abilities to perceive. Because authors' abilities to recognize their own intellectual contributions depend on percentage differences, and readers' abilities to recognize intellectual contributions depend on percentage differences, the numbers of elements in articles and books may have distributions that reflect these perceptual tendencies. Thus, the analysis below assumes that the logarithms of true values in the population of manuscripts have a Normal distribution with a mean at zero and a standard deviation of one. Although the lognormal seems the best choice on balance, it is only one of several similar distributions.
Assumptions About Review Processes. Many socialscience journals report that they publish around 15% to 25% of submissions, so the analysis assumes that editors publish 20% of the manuscripts they receive. The analysis also assumes that editors send manuscripts to two reviewers who determine the disposition of many manuscripts. If two reviewers cannot agree on acceptance or rejection, even after two revisions and three reviews, editors themselves intervene and accept a fraction of the manuscripts about which two reviewers disagreed. The analysis assumes that editors and reviewers have approximately equal abilities to assess manuscripts and that editors make independent judgments about manuscripts without being influenced by reviewers. However, based on reviews of editorial decisions, Cicchetti (2003) inferred that when faced with judgments from two reviewers, editors typically adopt the more negative judgment, and when faced with judgments from three reviewers, editors typically adopt the modal judgment.
These assumptions fall near the middle of actual editorial practices (Campanario 1998a , Schminke 2002 . In economics and finance, editors commonly send a manuscript to only a single reviewer, who makes a final decision. A survey by Seidl et al. (2001) revealed that more-prestigious economics journals use fewer reviewers than do less-prestigious journals. At the other extreme, one prestigious psychology journal sometimes sends manuscripts to five reviewers. Lindsey (1978) documented substantial variance in qualifications of reviewers and editors. Some editors seek highly qualified reviewers, others choose reviewers who are likely to disagree with each other, and still others use inexperienced reviewers such as doctoral students. Some editors inject their personal evaluations, whereas others mainly try to implement reviewers' decisions. Although these variations would alter the analysis, they do not affect the basic logic and they would shift the numbers little: Adding more reviewers has weak effects because correlations between reviewers are low.
My experience says that journals that use several reviewers, including editors who offer personal opinions, place more emphasis on authors' conforming to social norms. More reviewers generate more advice, so authors have to confront more demands for compliance. One reviewer explained without embarrassment: "The roles of the reviewers and editors are both gatekeepers and co-developers." Facing such attitudes, authors tend to believe that they must follow reviewers' advice even when they deem the advice ill-founded (Bedeian 2003 (Bedeian , 2004 Frey 2003; Starbuck 2003) .
Most journals ask reviewers to recommend acceptance, revision, or rejection. The analysis below assumes that each reviewer recommends rejecting 58% of the manuscripts, accepting 17%, and seeking revisions of 25%. These frequencies resemble ones that editors have reported, as listed in Table 1 . Although the assumed frequencies of acceptance and rejection do affect the distributions discussed below, they affect actions taken after a first review more than they affect actions taken after two or three reviews.
The Correlation Between Reviewers' Judgments and Manuscripts' True Value How accurately do reviewers appraise the true value of manuscripts? This is a key issue. Peters and Ceci (1982) conducted what may be the most discussed and controversial study of reviewing by journals. They resubmitted 12 articles to the very journals that had published them just 18 to 32 months earlier. All 12 were top-tier journals. Whereas authors from prestigious psychology departments originally had written the articles, Peters and Ceci gave the resubmissions fictitious authors with return addresses at obscure institutions. In all, 38 editors and reviewers saw the resubmissions. Three of these 38 recognized that submissions had already been published, which cut the sample to 9 articles that received 18 reviews. Out of 18 reviewers, 16 recommended rejection, and the 9 editors rejected 8 of the 9 articles.
Peters and Ceci's article drew 50 pages of commentary by others, and Cicchetti's (1991) report about low interrater agreement in 10 psychological and sociological journals drew 33 pages of commentary. Peer review elicits strong feelings and diverse attitudes (Baumeister 1990; Bedeian 1996a, b; Holbrook 1986 ). Gossip about inconsistent reviews and biased reviewers pervades academe, and studies have documented various biases of reviewers (Armstrong 1997; Bedeian 2003; Campanario 1996 Campanario , 1998b Ellison 2002; Hargens 1990; Horrobin 1990; Mahoney et al. 1978; Nylenna et al. 1994) . One interesting finding is that reviewers criticize the methodology of studies that cast doubt on theories that the reviewers like and they applaud the methodology of studies that support theories that they like (Mahoney 1977 (Mahoney , 1979 . There is no way to directly measure reviewers' abilities to discern manuscripts' true values, but two kinds of observations offer tangential evidence about these abilities. First, Gottfredson (1977 Gottfredson ( , 1978 found that reviewers' forecasts of manuscripts' impacts correlated only 0.37 with later citations and their ratings of manuscript quality correlated only 0.24 with later citations. If true values are less visible and more difficult to discern than citation values, correlations of reviewers' judgments with manuscripts' true values are lower than these correlations.
Second, as detailed in Table 2 , various studies have reported measures of agreement between reviewers that fall between 0.08 and 0.54 (Starbuck 2003) . These measures present three issues, however. First, two of the measures are product-moment correlations, two are Kappas, and most are intraclass correlation coefficients.
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These statistics have slightly different properties. Second, these measures were computed from data about reviewers' judgments that utilized three, four, or five categories-such as accept, revise, and reject-whereas the statistical models below assume continuous evaluation variables. Third, the measures in Table 2 indicate agreement about shared values rather than agreement about true values.
The next subsection of this article draws on the numbers in Tables 1 and 2 to infer confidence limits for reviewers' ability to assess a manuscript's true value. This inference process is rather complicated. However, I need to explain why my assumptions about these confidence limits are plausible, and I want to do this in a technically defensible way. Table 2 say about relations between reviewers' opinions and (Hendrick 1976 (Hendrick , 1977 pm = 0 21 140 5 Best paper, Consumer Psychology Division, American Psychological Association (Bowen et al. 1972 ) W = 0 11 10 judges ranked 8 papers 8
The Information Value of Agreement Between Reviewers. What might measures like those in
Notes. pm = product-moment correlation; R = intraclass correlation; K = Kappa; W = coefficient of concordance.
manuscripts' true values? If two reviewers' opinions correlate very strongly with manuscripts' true values, the reviewers' opinions would correlate very strongly with each other. However, reviewers' opinions could correlate strongly with each other even if they correlate weakly with true values. For their opinions to correlate strongly, reviewers must share values, but these values might involve elements other than manuscripts' true value. For example, reviewers might value a manuscript's relevance to a faddish topic that will drift into obscurity, they might value manuscripts' conformity to social norms that do not support generation of valid knowledge, or they might have high regard for authors from prestigious schools and low regard for authors from little-known schools (Bowen et al. 1972 , Lindsey 1978 , Pfeffer et al. 1977 . Although specialized journals might promote distinctive values, Gottfredson (1978) found no such differences among 299 editors and consulting editors for nine psychological journals.
Going from the measures in Table 2 to statements about reviewers' abilities to assess true value involves four steps. As would any measures of selection processes that are subject to error, the measures in Table 2 entail some uncertainty. Thus, the first step involves estimating standard deviations for the reported measures. The measures in Table 2 are of three different types-Kappas, product-moment correlations, and intraclass correlations. I found trivial differences between product-moment correlations and intraclass correlations, but Kappas have smaller absolute values than the other two measures. The second step transforms Kappas into numbers comparable with the other measures. The measures in Table 2 indicate correlations between reviewers' judgments, which fall into just three to five categories. The third step translates statements about correlations between reviewers' judgments into statements about theoretical correlations between reviewers' opinions, which the theory assumes to be finely measured evaluations symbolized by numbers accurate to decimal places. Both small numbers of judgment categories and random errors of classification cause judgment measures to differ from theoretical correlations between opinions. Thus, the third step draws inferences about correlation B in Figure 3 from measures of correlation A. The fourth step translates statements about correlations between reviewers' opinions into statements about correlations between reviewers' opinions and manuscripts' true values. That is, the fourth step attempts to draw inferences about correlation D from correlation B in Figure 3 . Because conjectures are necessary at this point, I consider a range of possibilities that show how correlation D depends on assumptions. All four steps utilize simulations.
3 The analyses could be algebraic, but simulation seemed easier, and it produces scatter diagrams that I intended to use in this article. Table 3 shows implications of the first three analytic steps. The third and fourth columns report 95% confidence limits for correlations between reviewers' judgments, results of the first two analytic steps. The three right-hand columns report 95% confidence limits for correlations between reviewers' opinions, results of the third analytic step.
The term opinion denotes a finely measured assessment, but reviewers do not report such opinions, so one must infer correlations between opinions from correlations between categorized judgments such as accept, revise, and reject. Potential distortions from reviewers' classifying manuscripts into small numbers of categories are not widely appreciated. For example, one reader of a draft of this article pointed out that reviewers often agree about whether manuscripts ought to be published. Possibly this reader, and many editors, overlooked the possibility that totally random judgments may agree strongly when the sample is small and high percentages of the judgments fall into one or two categories (reject, or drastic revise and reject). Cicchetti (1985) Notes. pm = product-moment correlation; R = intraclass correlation; K = Kappa.
showed that if utterly random numbers are converted to the binary categories reject-or-not-reject, apparent agreement between two short lists of random numbers could range as high as 80%. Indeed, because rejects outnumber not-rejects, such random data would exhibit the oftreported property that reviewers are more likely to agree about which articles to reject than about which articles to accept. The fourth analytic step translates correlations between reviewers' opinions into statements about correlations between reviewers' opinions and manuscripts' true values. That is, the fourth step attempts to draw inferences about correlation D from correlation B in Figure 3 . Because conjectures are necessary at this point, I consider a range of possibilities.
Reviewers' shared values intervene between reviewers' opinions and manuscripts' true values, so correlation D relates more directly to correlation C than to correlation B. Correlations between reviewers' opinions (as estimated in Table 3 ) do not arise solely from reviewers' mutual appreciation of manuscripts' true value. True value should be a quality on which almost all reviewers agree. If reviewers agree strongly on shared values that differ from the values of most other people, one can observe a strong correlation between reviewers that has only a weak component coming from a manuscript's true value. When data encompass hundreds of diverse reviewers, it seems very unlikely that the correlations between shared values and true values go as low as zero or as high as one. Would it be reasonable to assume that shared values correlate 0.5 with true values? Or 0.25? Or even 0.75? Editors who choose reviewers who tend to disagree with each other might be able to raise this correlation to higher values, but no journal receives numer-ous citations to more than two thirds of its articles, and only a tiny fraction (0.6%) of journals receive numerous citations to more than 30% of their articles. 4 The many reasons why people share values that are uncorrelated or weakly correlated with scientific principles suggest that true values ordinarily correlate less than 0.5 with shared values. However, there would be variation among pairs of reviewers and possibly variation among fields of study, so I have made computations for correlations of 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75. All considered, it seems reasonable to infer that correlations between reviewers' opinions and manuscripts' true values are almost always less than 0.5 and usually below 0.3. Indeed, these correlations could fall below 0.1 in some journals or with some pairs of reviewers. Therefore, the computations to follow consider 0.15, 0.3, and 0.45, and implicitly the range between them. To reduce verbosity, I call reviewers' average correlation with true value "Rho."
The next two sections of this article show how editorial reviews vary as functions of Rho. The next section looks at a single review cycle in which two reviewers render independent judgments about each manuscript, and the ensuing section looks at the disposition of manuscripts after successive revisions and reevaluations by reviewers and a terminating judgment by an editor. Both parts of this process are graphed for both Rho = 0 15 and Rho = 0 45. If Rho is sometimes below 0.15 or above 0.45, these are very unusual events. Because 0.15 and 0.45 are supposed to be extremes, the discussion also reports implications of Rho = 0 3, which may approximate expected values.
Outcomes of First Reviews
Saying that a reviewer's evaluations correlate Rho with logarithms of true value implies that the evaluations have a distribution with a mean at Rho * (true value). For example, if a reviewer's evaluations correlate 0.2 with logarithms of true value, manuscripts with a true value of 2 would have a mean evaluation of 0 2 * 0 3 = 0 06, because log 2 = 0 3. Likewise, if a reviewer's evaluations correlate 0.3 with logarithms of true value, manuscripts with a true value of 5 would have a mean evaluation of 0 3 * 0 7 = 0 21 because log 5 = 0 7.
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The gray area in Figure 5 shows the population of submissions. The gray lines show distributions of manuscripts that would receive rejects from both of two reviewers after first review, and the black lines show distributions for two accepts. The solid gray line assumes that Rho = 0 15; 12% of these rejected manuscripts represent editorial errors because they actually belong in the highest-value 20% of manuscripts. The dashed gray line assumes that Rho = 0 45; 6% of these rejected manuscripts represent editorial errors because they come from the highest-value 20%. For the in-between case where Rho = 0 3, 10% of the rejected manuscripts represent editorial errors. All distributions for Rho between 0.15 and 0.45 overlap the population distribution to considerable degrees, so rejected manuscripts have a distribution much like the population of submissions.
Figure 5 also graphs distributions of manuscripts that would receive accepts from both reviewers after the first review. The solid black line assumes that, on average, Rho = 0 15, and the dashed black line assumes that, on average, Rho = 0 45. When Rho = 0 15, only onefourth of the accepted manuscripts actually belong in Log of true value of manuscript Percent of manuscripts Population Rho = 0.45, two rejects, 6% belong in highest-value 20% of manuscripts Rho = 0.15, two rejects, 12% belong in highest-value 20% of manuscripts Rho = 0.45, two accepts, 78% belong in highest-value 20% of manuscripts Rho = 0.15, two accepts, 26% belong in highest-value 20% of manuscripts 4 3 2 the highest-value 20% of submissions and three quarters represent errors because they should not have been accepted. When Rho = 0 45, these percentages reverse: 78% of the accepted manuscripts come from the highestvalue 20% and 22% represent errors. When Rho = 0 3, half of the accepted manuscripts belong in the highestvalue 20% and half represent errors. Acceptance errors occur often because four-fifths of the submissions, and hence four-fifths of the opportunities to make errors, are manuscripts that should not be accepted (Rousseeuw 1991, Stinchcombe and Ofshe 1969) . However, the error rate is much lower when Rho is above 0.4. Figure 6 shows what happens to the best 20% of manuscripts when Rho varies from 0.15 to 0.45. Manuscripts classified as "mixed evaluation" are any that did not receive accepts from both reviewers or rejects from both reviewers. The percentage of excellent manuscripts receiving two rejects after first review declines from 20% when Rho = 0 15 to 11% when Rho = 0 45. The percentage of excellent manuscripts receiving two accepts rises from 4% when Rho = 0 15 to 22% when Rho = 0 45. Unfortunately, it seems that Rho rarely goes as high as 0.45. For the in-between case when Rho = 0 3, just 9% of the excellent manuscripts receive two accepts.
The curvature in Figure 6 nearly disappears when calculations take all submissions into account. The percentage of all manuscripts receiving two rejects after the first review rises only slightly from 34% to 37% as Rho rises from 0.15 to 0.45, whereas the percentage of all manuscripts receiving two accepts rises from 3% to 6%. Obviously, for Rho in this range, the disposition of manuscripts depends very weakly on reviewers' abilities to discern true values. This selection process discriminates so poorly that the phrase "blind review" is apt in an unintended way. Rho, average correlation of reviewers with log of true value
Percent of manuscripts Two accepts Mixed evaluations Two rejects
How Editorial Decisions After Three Reviews Differ from Those After First Reviews
Many of my colleagues believe that reviewers will be more likely to accept their manuscripts if they comply with reviewers' "suggestions" and more likely to reject their manuscripts if they reject reviewers' "suggestions" (Bedeian 2003 , Frey 2003 . On the premise that reviewers do reward compliance, these calculations assume that reviewers become 50% more likely to issue two accepts and only 70% as likely to issue two rejects during the second and third reviews. Experiments disclose, however, that these moderate assumptions about reviewers' reactions have trivial effects. Figure 7 shows the dispositions of all submissions after authors have revised some of them once or even twice. This calculation assumes authors revise and resubmit half of the mixed evaluations from the first review and 80% of the mixed evaluations from the second review. The percentage of manuscripts receiving two rejects is quite independent of Rho.
One can now estimate how often editors must be intervening. For Rho between 0.15 and 0.45, dual acceptances fall between 6% and 13%, being 8% when Rho = 0 3. Yet journals accept 15% to 25% of submissions. One explanation for this difference would be that editors are making final decisions about manuscripts with mixed evaluations.
Editorial intervention eliminates the blank area labeled "mixed evaluations" in Figure 7 ; all manuscripts are finally accepted or rejected. Indeed, because there is no reason to believe that Rho affects the percentage of manuscripts that journals publish, editorial actions turn Figure 7 into two regions separated by a horizontal line: 75% to 85% rejections and 15% to 25% acceptances. For lower values of Rho, manuscripts accepted through editors' interventions outnumber those accepted by review- ers, and for higher values of Rho, manuscripts accepted by reviewers outnumber those accepted through editors' interventions. Figure 8 compares the distributions of manuscripts that ultimately receive rejects with those that receive accepts. The two solid lines assume that Rho = 0 15, and the two dashed lines assume that Rho = 0 45. The distributions of rejected manuscripts (gray lines) are very similar: About one-seventh of the manuscripts that receive rejects belong in the highest-value 20%, and these comprise more than half of the manuscripts in the highest-value 20%. Because journals reject four to seven times as many manuscripts as they accept, there are many more opportunities for erroneous judgments among rejected manuscripts than among accepted ones.
The largest effect of higher correlations between reviewers' judgments and true value is better selection of manuscripts for acceptance. For manuscripts in the highest-value 20%, accepts rise to 71% when Rho = 0 45, although only 43% receive accepts when Rho = 0 3. These acceptance percentages are slightly lower than after a single review because under the assumptions of this model, editors must agree only with themselves, whereas reviewers must agree with each other, so editors are more likely to accept the wrong manuscripts.
Figures 5 and 8 are very similar. Similarity results in part from assuming that authors are equally likely to revise all mixed-evaluation manuscripts and that reviewers evaluate revised manuscripts afresh. Obviously, editors and reviewers influence authors' decisions about whether to revise, and reviewers usually remember (or journals remind them) what they said earlier. However, encouragement or discouragement by editors or reviewers cannot have effects beyond those supported by the underlying Rho, because people who misperceive true value are very likely to offer advice or to demand changes that are uncorrelated with true value.
A few studies have found that reviewers agree more strongly about whether to publish a manuscript than about what is wrong with the manuscript. For instance, Mahoney (1977 Mahoney ( , 1979 obtained interrater correlations around 0.3 for recommendations about acceptance and for ratings of scientific contribution, but he found interrater correlations close to zero for ratings of methodology, relevance, and quality of discussion.
How Much Better Can the Most Prestigious Journals Be?
We now return to the topic that initiated this study: the stratification of journals. This section estimates the maximum advantages of high status by analyzing a review process that gives all of the advantages to the highest-status journals. Thus, the inferences drawn likely overstate quality differences among strata. This section also compares inferred differences in the value of articles published by different strata with reported citation rates.
The analysis assumes authors initially submit all of their manuscripts to journals in the first quintile, which choose 20% to publish. Disappointed authors then submit the remaining manuscripts to journals in the second quintile, which also choose 20% to publish. However, because the second-quintile journals receive only 80% as many manuscripts as first-quintile journals, they publish only 16% of the original submissions. Authors then submit the remaining manuscripts to journals in the third quintile, and so on through all five quintiles. If the highest-quintile journals were actually able to select the best 20% of the manuscripts, none of the best 20% would remain for second-quintile journals, and the articles appearing in the higher-ranking journals would have distinctly higher true value. However, if the highestquintile journals are able to select only one third of the manuscripts in the highest-value 20%, two thirds remain for lower-status journals; in this case, a sequence of five journals would publish 67% of the best 20% of submissions, leaving 33% unpublished. Figure 9 compares distributions of manuscripts that ultimately receive acceptances from journals in various strata when Rho = 0 15. The gray area shows the population of manuscripts when initially produced. The heaviest black line shows acceptances by journals in the first quintile to receive them; 23% of these manuscripts belong in the highest-value 20% of all manuscripts, and the average accepted article is one-fourth of a standard Population First quintile, 23% in highest-value 20% of manuscripts Second-third quintiles, 20% in highest-value 20% of manuscripts Fourth-fifth quintiles, 15% in highestvalue 20% of manuscripts deviation above the population mean. The medium black line shows acceptances by journals in the second and third quintiles; 20% of these manuscripts belong in the highest-value 20% of all manuscripts. The lightest black line shows acceptances by journals in the fourth and fifth quintiles; 15% of these manuscripts belong in the highest-value 20% of all manuscripts, and the average accepted article has a value near the population mean. Of the manuscripts in the highest-value 20%, a depressing 30% are rejected by five journals in sequence. Figure 10 compares distributions of manuscripts that receive two accepts when Rho = 0 45. Again, the gray area shows the population. The heaviest black line shows acceptances by the first quintile; 71% of these manuscripts belong in the highest-value 20%, and the average accepted article is more than one standard deviation above the population mean. The medium black line shows acceptances by the second and third quintiles; 38% of these manuscripts belong in the highestvalue 20%. The lightest black line shows acceptances by the fourth and fifth quintiles; only 2% of these manuscripts belong in the highest-value 20% of all manuscripts, and the average accepted article has a value slightly below the population mean. All manuscripts in the highest-value 20% receive acceptances from one journal or another. Figure 11 shows the in-between case when Rho = 0 3: 43% of acceptances by the first quintile belong in the highest-value 20% of all manuscripts, as do 29% of acceptances by the second and third quintiles, and 13% of acceptances by the fourth and fifth quintiles. This Log of true value of manuscript This portrayal of academic publishing does not allow for specialization by journals or for authors' selecting journals that focus on specific subtopics or specific methodologies. The analysis assumes that all journals are equally interested in all manuscripts and that all authors send their manuscripts to the highest-quintile journals first. Specialization enables less-prestigious journals to attract higher-value manuscripts, which could decrease differentiation between lower-status and higherstatus journals. Less-prestigious journals have probably made gains over the last two decades, as graphed in Figure 2 , by developing specialized niches. Many lessprestigious journals also take more risks when selecting manuscripts for publication, which increases the variance in what they publish but also makes them more welcoming to innovative topics or methodologies.
Of course, not all authors send all of their manuscripts to first-quintile journals initially, but it is debatable how much these deviations from the assumptions may affect overall patterns. Authors make misjudgments about their manuscripts at least as often as reviewers do, and because an author's decision is very categoricalwhether to submit this manuscript to a journal in that quintile-it would be a noisy decision. Furthermore, authors' choices of where to submit manuscripts reflect factors other than their judgments about manuscripts' true values. Many authors submit to lower-status journals not because they deem their manuscripts to lack value, but because they are hoping for friendlier editors and less-intrusive reviewers. Figures 9 and 10 to consider the stratification of average citation values. The three center columns give the ratios when the correlation between citers' judgments and citation values is 0.15, 0.3, or 0.45. The righthand column gives averages of the ratios graphed in Figure 2 . The table shows that citation patterns of social scientists have a steeper status hierarchy than would be consistent with the belief that citers' judgments correlate 0.15 with articles' citation values, but citation patterns have a much flatter status hierarchy than would be consistent with the belief that citers' judgments correlate 0.45 with articles' citation values. Citation patterns resemble the belief that citers' judgments correlate 0.31 with articles' citation values.
How Citers' Judgments Correlate with Articles' Citation Values.
The numbers in Table 6 cast doubt on the idea that Rho could be as high as 0.45. If Rho were that high, citations would be much more stratified than they actually are, because readers of journals would have higher confidence that the best articles appear in the most prestigious journals. Although there are other reasons to cite articles other than their true values, it seems unlikely that these other reasons are sufficient to cut the ratios of citation rates for the first-quintile journals from 32.9 to 5.8. Table 7 takes this notion of citation value further to examine differences among social science fields. Citations of psychology journals are consistent with belief that citers' judgments correlate between 0.33 and 0.37 with citation values. By contrast, citations of sociology journals are consistent with the belief that this correlation falls between 0.28 and 0.31.
Although the numbers in Table 7 generally resemble those assumed in the analyses of editorial review, the 
Implications for Faculty Evaluation
Expectations about true values should depend on Rho:
The more confidence one has in reviewers' judgments, the higher value one should assign to publishing in prestigious journals. Using average true value of articles in the fourth and fifth quintiles of journals as a norm, the upper half of Table 8 lists implied average true values of articles in the first quintile and second and third quintiles of journals. Although one could use these averages as metrics with which to evaluate articles by individual faculty, every category of journals publishes articles with a very wide range of true values, so average true values for journals actually provide no useful information about any single article. The lower half of Table 8 demonstrates this dispersion by listing ranges of true values that one can expect to find in different quintiles of journals. Departments and schools rarely base faculty evaluations on a single article, and the ambiguity indicated by Table 8 decreases as researchers produce more manuscripts. Figures 12 and 13 describe expected distributions of articles by a single author as a function of the average true value of that author's manuscripts. For example, when Rho = 0 15, authors whose average manuscripts are at the 90% percentile (1.28 standard deviations above the mean) would publish 32% of their manuscripts in the first quintile of journals, 46% in the second and third quintiles, and 23% in the fourth and fifth quintiles, and none of their manuscripts would remain unpublished. At the opposite extreme, when Rho = 0 45, authors at the 60% percentile would publish 25% of their manuscripts in the first quintile of journals, 34% in the second and third quintiles, and 20% in the fourth and fifth quintiles, and 20% would be rejected by five journals in sequence. These distributions assume that the standard deviation of a hypothetical author's manuscripts is one-fourth of the population standard deviation. Because Figures 12 and 13 describe expected percentages, which would be approximated only by very large samples, small samples of an author's work may depart noticeably from these expectations. Higher values of Rho give an advantage to authors who consistently produce higher-value manuscripts and give a disadvantage to authors who produce lower-value manuscripts. When Rho is low, journals make erroneous decisions more often, and poorer manuscripts have higher probabilities of acceptance by higher-prestige journals. However, according to Figure 13 , even when Rho = 0 45, an author whose manuscripts fall into the 90th percentile would publish only 77% in the first quintile of journals, and the other 23% would appear in the second and third quintiles. Under the more plausible assumption that Rho = 0 3, an author whose manuscripts fall into the 90th percentile would publish only half in the first quintile of journals, and would publish the other half in the second and third quintiles. Figures 12 and 13 imply that many authors meet repeated failure. In fact, Trieschmann et al. (2000) reported that authors from the top 50 business schools account for 70% of the articles in 20 prestigious business journals. I have been unable to think of a rationale other than laziness or simplicity that would support actually ignoring publications that are not in top-tier journals. Any decision rule that discards potential information cannot perform better than an equally reasonable rule that utilizes all information. Furthermore, because even articles in the lowest quintile of journals may actually belong among the best 20% written, it makes no sense to dismiss these articles as valueless merely based on where they appeared. For those who insist on basing assessments solely on the journals in which articles appear, a more rational evaluation scheme would be to use the average true values associated with different categories of journals, as listed in Table 8 . Looking Only at Counts of Articles in A Journals. It is possible to draw some inferences about the average value of an author's manuscripts based solely on information about the percentage of publications in toptier journals, and these inferences have some surprising characteristics. We will consider first inferences possible from very large numbers of articles and then inferences possible from just 20 articles. Figure 14 shows how the percentiles of authors' average manuscripts vary with the percentage that appeared in the highest-quintile journals. The steepest lines made of small dashes represent the assumption that Rho = 0 15, the least-steep lines made of alternating short and long dashes represent the assumption that Rho = 0 45, and the solid lines represent the assumption that Rho = 0 3. Heavy black lines describe expected average values, and thinner gray lines describe 80% confidence intervals that assume the author has produced numerous manuscripts. For example, if Rho = 0 15, authors with 40% of their publications in the first quintile of journals have published manuscripts with an average value in the 86th to 90th percentiles. However, if Rho = 0 45, authors with 40% of their publications in the first quintile journals have published manuscripts with an average value in the 44th to 62nd percentiles. The curves for Rho = 0 15 terminate near the center of the chart because the randomness of review processes makes it impossible to place more than 60% of a large sample in the highest-quintile journals. Percentage of numerous manuscripts published by top-quintile journals Figure 14 . A practically useful analysis must allow for small to moderately large samples. Actual publications are binomial processes with each author submitting a limited number of manuscripts and with probabilities of acceptance set by review processes. Figure 15 shows what happens to Figure 14 when authors have produced 20 articles. Again, the steepest lines made of small dashes represent the assumption that Rho = 0 15, the flattest lines made of alternating small and large dashes represent the assumption that Rho = 0 45, and the solid lines represent the assumption that Rho = 0 3. The heavy black lines describe expected average values, and the thinner gray lines describe 80% confidence intervals.
Although the small sample widens the confidence intervals, two regions have rather clear implications. The blank area at the upper left shows that an author who has published 20 articles with 3 or fewer in the first-quintile journals is very likely to be producing research that averages below the 60th percentile. Likewise, the blank area at the lower right shows that an author who has published 20 articles with 4 or more in the first-quintile journals is very unlikely to be producing research in the lowest 30% of submissions. The different values of Rho have similar implications when authors have published 3 to 7 articles in the first quintile out of 20. Authors who have published 5 articles out of 20 in the first quintile may have been producing manuscripts that average value as high as the 80th percentile or as low as the 44th percentile if Rho = 0 15, as high as the 71st percentile or as low as the 35th percentile if Rho = 0 3, and as high as the 65th percentile or as low as the 30th percentile if Rho = 0 45.
Because articles published in high-prestige journals receive significantly more citations, departments and schools that strongly emphasize publication in the mostprestigious journals may be pursuing visibility, which attracts students and faculty. However, actual citation behavior does not support an exclusive focus on highprestige journals. On average, 2.4 articles in the second and third quintiles of journals draw as many citations as 1 article in the first quintile of journals, and 5.8 articles in the fourth and fifth quintiles of journals draw as many citations as 1 article in the first quintile of journals. These ratios vary, however, across academic fields. Top-tier publications attract higher percentages of citations in psychology and lower percentages in sociology. Moreover, if departments and schools want to measure individuals' visibility, in addition to using journals' prestige as a proxy, they can use citations of specific articles, appearances at conferences, and even solicited data about reputations.
Conclusion
Although higher-prestige journals publish more highvalue articles, editorial selection involves considerable randomness. Highly prestigious journals publish quite a few low-value articles, low-prestige journals publish some excellent articles, and excellent manuscripts may receive successive rejections from several journals. Evaluating articles based primarily on which journals published them is more likely than not to yield incorrect assessments of articles' values. Yet personnel evaluations by many departments and schools seem to underestimate or even to ignore this randomness, and in extreme cases these evaluations focus on one myopic measure.
For most departments and schools, extreme emphasis on publication in top-tier journals has a significant probability of introducing randomness because the confidence intervals associated with such publications are very wide. Furthermore, an evaluation process that discards potentially useful information is less sensible than a process that takes advantage of all available information. However, departments and schools could use publication in top-tier journals as a reliable criterion for personnel who have published many articles (say, more than 50) with high percentages of these articles in top journals. Indeed, widespread use of this criterion would help elite departments and schools to retain their statuses by enabling them to select and retain excellent researchers while adding randomness into the personnel decisions of most departments and schools. If lower-status departments and schools are adopting this criterion to imitate their more successful competitors, imitation is placing the imitators at a disadvantage relative to those they are imitating. Might it be possible to find evidence about whether departments and schools fare differently over time if they use different criteria in personnel decisions?
People who are dealing with unreliable data should attempt to cross-check their data by triangulating different kinds of data and data from different sources. Even departments and schools that could use publication in top-tier journals as a reliable criterion could give their decisions more reliable foundations by taking additional evidence into account and by analyzing all available data in some depth. Of course, it is debatable whether better data would produce better personnel decisions, but that is a topic for another article. Personnel decisions entail even more uncertainty than does peer review. For one thing, universities are making commitments for longterm future periods whereas data concern past activities. For another thing, faculty migration gives individuals opportunities to overcome adverse decisions and it undercuts universities' efforts to overtake higher-status competitors.
The simulations behind Figure 4 and Table 4 suggest some practical implications for editors. If the correlation between reviewers is below 0.4, which is very likely, editors should assume that the reviewers' judgments correlate weakly with manuscripts' true values. Only when there is a fairly high correlation between reviewers should editors consider reviewers' judgments to yield useful information about manuscripts' true values. Furthermore, editors are more likely to obtain useful information about manuscripts' true values if they choose reviewers who hold different values from each other.
The simulations and algebraic analyses in this article assume that reviewers' opinions have the same variance as the population of submissions. I also experimented with an alternative assumption that reviewers' opinions have only half the population variance, which amounts to saying that reviewers judge manuscripts as being more similar than they really are. This assumption greatly reduces agreement between reviewers and greatly reduces correlations between reviewers' opinions and manuscripts' shared values. Thus, editors receive less-useful information when they use reviewers whose judgments have restricted ranges.
Authors of research manuscripts can draw similar inferences from reviewers' judgments. That is, if reviewers disagree with each other, authors should infer that reviewers' judgments say little about the true values of manuscripts, but if reviewers agree fairly strongly, authors should infer that reviewers' judgments reflect the true values of manuscripts to some degree. When they agree with each other, reviewers who seem to espouse different values are probably offering especially informative judgments.
Of course, reviewers who agree strongly are not prevalent, and reviewers are especially prone to disagree about a specific manuscript-what does it do right; what does it need? In particular, reviewers' comments about research methodology may be cloaking agreement or disagreement of their personal values with studies' findings. Authors should expect to receive inconsistent reviews, and they dare not rely on editors and reviewers to tell them what to do. Because academic research elicits mainly negative judgments, authors dare not let negative reviews undermine their confidence in their work. Although it is useful to listen to what reviewers say (Starbuck 2003) , authors need to base their ultimate decisions on their own expertise and their own values.
The belief that high-status journals publish excellent articles whereas low-status journals publish poor articles may be impeding the development of knowledge. The analysis in this article indicates that 29% to 77% of the articles in the first quintile of journals do not belong among the highest-value 20% of manuscripts, the in-between estimate being 57%. If publication in highstatus journals leads social scientists to adopt less valuable articles as exemplars, mediocre articles are exerting as much or more influence on scientific values as are excellent articles. Like people making personnel decisions, researchers should triangulate different kinds of evidence about scientific contributions and draw evidence from diverse sources. Before one can deal effectively with randomness, one must acknowledge its existence.
However, it may be impossible for either intraclass correlation coefficients or Kappas to have absolute values as large as 1.0. One can use different weighing schemes when calculating Kappas, and calculations in this article use linear weights. 3 The first set of simulations explored properties of the measures of agreement-intraclass correlations, Kappas, and product-moment correlations. The computer generated a first reviewer's opinion as a normally distributed variable with a mean of zero and variance of 1, and then generated a second reviewer's opinion as a normally distributed variable with a mean of R times the first reviewer's opinion-R being an assumed correlation between reviewers. Because this correlation transmits some variance from the first reviewer to the second reviewer, if the first reviewer has a variance of 1, the generated opinions of the second reviewer must have a variance of 1 − R-squared in order that both opinions will have the same variance. Both reviewers' opinions were then converted to the categories accept, revise, and reject or the categories accept, minor revise, revise, drastic revise, and reject. Categorization used values of the normal distribution that would hypothetically produce frequencies of 17%, 25%, and 58% or 17%, 12.5%, 12.5%, 29%, and 29%. For example, a reviewer who recommends acceptance if the normal deviate is above 0.954 would accept 17% of the manuscripts. After this process was repeated for a sample of 50 manuscripts, the classified judgments were used to compute an intraclass correlation, a Kappa, and a product-moment correlation. All of the foregoing was repeated 50 times for R = −0 95, 50 times for R = −0 90, and so forth up to 50 times for R = 0 95. Results were recorded, then all of the above was repeated for samples of 100, 200, 500, 1,500, and 15,000 manuscripts. These calculations allowed estimates of the standard deviations of the measures in Table 2 , and they showed that intraclass correlations and product-moment correlations give very similar numbers whereas Kappas generally have smaller absolute values.
A second set of simulations looked at relations between reviewers' judgments, which place manuscripts in a few discrete categories, and their finely graded opinions of manuscripts. The computer generated a normally distributed "shared value" for each manuscript, and then two opinions that correlated with this shared value. Both reviewers' opinions were normally distributed variables with means of R * (shared value) and with variances of 1 − R-squared. Opinions were classified in three or five categories with the expected frequencies of 17%, 25%, and 58% or 17%, 12.5%, 12.5%, 29%, and 29%. A sample of 50 manuscripts was generated and productmoment correlations were computed between opinions and between judgments. This process was repeated 10 times for R = 0, R = 0 01, R = 0 02, and so on up to R = 0 99, then results were recorded. All of the above was repeated for sample sizes of 50, 100, 200, 500, 5,000, and 15,000. These calculations supported estimates of the ratios of the correlations between opinions versus the correlations between judgments as well as standard deviations for these ratios.
A third set of simulations investigated relations of reviewers' opinions and judgments with manuscripts' true values. It had a logical flow similar to Figure 3 . The computer generated a normally distributed "true value" for each manuscript, then generated a normally distributed "shared value" that correlated with this true value, and then generated two opinions that correlated with this shared value. The shared value was normally distributed with a mean of R * (true value) and with a variance of 1 − R-squared, and the two reviewers' opinions were normally distributed variables with means of P * (shared value) and with variances of 1 − P -squared. Opinions were classified in three or five categories with the expected frequencies of 17%, 25%, and 58% or 17%, 12.5%, 12.5%, 29%, and 29%. A sample of 50 manuscripts was generated and productmoment correlations were computed between opinions and between judgments. This process was repeated 10 times for P = 0, P = 0 05, P = 0 1, and so on up to P = 0 95, then results were recorded. All of the above was repeated for sample sizes of 50, 100, 200, 500, and 1,000 and for R = 0 25, 0.5, 0.75, and 0.95. These calculations verified the conjecture that the assumed value of R affords a good basis for estimating the correlation of each reviewer's opinions with true value as well as regression estimates of the standard deviations of this relationship (Figure 4) . 4 Citations are skewed and approximately lognormal. ISI cataloged citations to 1,705 social science journals that received citations during 1999. During 1999, these journals published over 70,000 articles, which received nearly 2 million citations, almost all of these citations to articles published before 1999. In fact, the articles published during 1997, 1998, and 1999 account for only about 300,000 of the 2 million citations, so the bulk of citations refer to articles that are more than two years old. On average, articles published by these journals during 1997 and 1998 received 0.5 citations during 1999; the most-cited quintile had an average impact of 1.93, the second and third quintiles had an average impact of 0.67, and the fourth and fifth quintiles had an average impact of 0.18.
In mid-2004, ISI's listing of most-cited articles included 600 articles published during 1999; these had received at least 10 citations from 1999 to mid-2004, and as many as 193 citations. For these 600 articles, the logarithm of the number of times they were cited correlated 0.44 with the logarithm of the 1999 impact ratings of the journals that published them. Among the 1,705 journals, 1,536 journals (90%) had no articles among the most-cited 600 and 169 had one or more articles among the most-cited 600. Only two journals (Behavioral and Brain Sciences and Journal of Economic Literature) had more than 50% of the articles they published among the mostcited 600, and just eight other journals had over 30% of the articles they published among the most-cited 600. The foregoing statistics only describe citations by journals to journals; citations to books or by books are not included. 5 The calculations assume that the editor and the two reviewers have slightly different correlations with true value: One reviewer has a correlation of 1 2 * Rho, the other has a correlation of 0 8 * Rho, and the editor has a correlation of Rho. For example, if the editor's correlation is 0.2, one reviewer's correlation is 0.24 and the other reviewer's correlation is 0.16. This assumption seems more realistic than three identical reviewers, but it has a negligible effect on the inferences.
